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Abstract
The paper examines the role of discourse in supporting firm’s decisions to relocate and 
how main actors influence such discourse. If there is uncertainty about the general 
functioning of the economy, discourse is the place where ideas and paradigms, and 
possible options of behavior, are created. Since interests are not given a priori but are 
socially constructed, discourse contributes to their definition by selecting, amplifying 
and legitimizing arguments and causal relationships between the functioning of the 
market and individual behavior. Some surveys of German companies show that while 
relocation is increasing, the advantages for firms are less clear than expected. The main 
argument of the paper is that the public debate in German newspapers and the busi-
ness press since the 1990s could have influenced the processes of decision-making over 
relocation by amplifying the disadvantages of remaining in Germany and neglecting 
the conflicts and additional costs arising for companies by relocating their production 
activities.
Zusammenfassung
Das Paper beschäftigt sich mit der Rolle des Diskurses und dessen Hauptprotagonisten 
bei der Förderung von Entscheidungen über Betriebsverlagerungen. Wenn die Wirt-
schaftsbedingungen ungewiss sind, ist der Diskurs ein „Ort“, an dem Ideen und Para-
digmen sowie mögliche Handlungsoptionen „kreiert“ werden. Da Interessen nicht als 
gegeben angenommen werden können, sondern vielmehr als „sozial konstruiert“ be-
trachtet werden sollten, trägt der Diskurs zur Definition der Interessen von Akteuren 
bei, indem er Argumente und Kausalbeziehungen zwischen dem Funktionieren des 
Marktes und dem individuellen Handeln auswählt, verstärkt bzw. legitimiert. Einige 
Umfragen in deutschen Unternehmen zeigen, dass die Vorteile für Firmen nicht so ein-
deutig sind, obwohl die Anzahl der Produktionsverlagerungen wächst. Das Paper argu-
mentiert, dass die öffentliche Debatte in deutschen Zeitungen und Businessmagazinen 
seit den 1990er-Jahren die Entscheidungsprozesse über Produktionsverlagerungen be-
einflusst haben könnte, indem die Nachteile der Produktion in Deutschland stark be-
tont sowie potenzielle Konflikte und zusätzliche Kosten ausgeblendet wurden, die für 
die Firmen bei der Produktionsverlagerung zusätzlich entstehen.
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1 Introduction
The findings of recent studies into relocation by German companies are puzzling. On 
the one hand, intentions to relocate are increasing; on the other, once investments have 
taken place, it would seem that entrepreneurs are faced with further costs they had not 
expected before (Kinkel/Lay/Maloca 2004; Schulte 2002; Hirsch-Kreinsen/Schulte 2000). 
These costs are not irrelevant as many of the companies must even repatriate their pro-
duction activities, or at least continue to produce inefficiently. The questions are then 
why they decide to relocate and why their expectations are disappointed in the end.
The literature on globalization in general and on relocation in particular points mainly 
to “good reasons” for relocation and offers mainly technological, political, organiza-
tional and institutional explanations. The diffusion of new technologies, for example, 
facilitates communication and economic exchange by reducing the costs for companies 
engaged in international exchanges and transnational company management (Castells 
2000). Secondly, the processes of liberalization in developing countries have helped to 
attract foreign investment due to fiscal advantages and lower labor costs and to make 
relocation more convenient for companies than trading from the home country (Faini 
2004). Thirdly, in some sectors like the auto industry, relocation is essentially the result 
of a chain reaction, as the main customers expanding internationally require suppliers 
to follow them and provide continuity in quality and compliance in the production 
process (Faust/Voskamp/Wittke 2004; Womack/Jones/Roos 1990). Finally, the institu-
tional asset of the home country can facilitate or even push relocation processes. On the 
one hand, the advantages of reducing costs are supposed to be more relevant for entre-
preneurs situated in liberal economies, as firms are more dependent on market coor-
dination (Hall/Soskice 2001). On the other hand, companies operating in coordinated 
market economies, characterized by higher labor and non-wage labor costs, could also 
become attracted by cutting labor costs to become more competitive and bring govern-
ments under pressure to carry out reforms (Crouch/Streeck 1997).
Beside these possible explanations I focus my attention on the role of the discourse on 
relocation and of the main actors in the discourse itself in encouraging companies to 
relocate.1 The aim of the paper is to point to coherence between the discourse and the 
I am very grateful to Kathrin Woltering for her support in conducting the press analysis and to Jens 
Beckert, Patrick Aspers, Akos Rona-Tas and Jack Barbalet for their useful comments and suggestions 
regarding previous versions of the paper. A special thank to the two referees Nina Bandelj and Brooke 
Harrington for their incisive and very helpful review.
1 I define public discourse as the structure and content of public debate. Ideas are constructed, 
articulated and diffused in public debate and constitute the content of the debate. In the paper 
I will mainly focus on the content and less systematically on the structural aspects of discourse. 
Public discourse can take place in different kinds of arenas (like the press, TV debates, confer-
ences, business meetings) that vary not only in terms of the medium used and its logic but also 
in the quality and quantity of the audience. However, the arguments in the debate might not 
necessarily be different, since they depend upon the main actors involved in the discourse.
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concrete processes of relocation and to provide theoretical arguments that would sup-
port the presence of a causal relationship between the two. In fact, while more research 
is still needed to prove such a relationship empirically, it can nevertheless be argued that, 
especially if there is uncertainty about the general functioning of the economy (Beckert 
1996, 1999, 2002; Culpepper 2003; Iida 1993), public discourse can be considered an 
arena in which the “good reasons” I mentioned before are constructed and diffused, and 
in which ideas and paradigms and possible options of behavior are created. Since in-
terests are not given a priori, but are socially constructed, discourse contributes to their 
definition by selecting, amplifying and legitimizing arguments and causal relationships 
(Schmidt 2003) between the functioning of the market and individual behavior. It helps 
not only to make new types of behavior ideationally legitimate and plausible but also 
to facilitate the flow of information about the behavior of the other actors and their 
motivations, which fosters imitation processes in turn.
The paper is organized as follows. Firstly, I deal with the role of ideas and imitation 
processes as they affect the change of interests in markets, especially under conditions 
of uncertainty, and I apply this theoretical framework to the case of relocation (Sec-
tions 2–4). Secondly, I turn to the development and contradictions of the relocation 
processes undertaken by German companies and to the analysis of the discourse on 
relocation in the German press between 1990 and 2005 (Sections 5–7). Finally, I outline 
some conclusions and prospects.
2 Uncertainty and interest change in markets:   
The role of ideas and imitation
The question of why companies decide to relocate their production to low-wage coun-
tries and how this choice becomes a more general trend can be translated in more theo-
retical terms into the question of how entrepreneurs’ interests change and what kinds of 
mechanisms set this change in motion. In a more static perspective, market actors ob-
serve each other and reproduce order by making decisions about their position on the 
basis of prior production periods (White 1981). However, the question is how change in 
such order can be explained and, in a context of uncertainty, which mechanisms might 
cause new actors’ strategies to converge.2
 The discourse generated by the debate among actors and the mediation of journalists contrib-
utes to both the creation and articulation and to the modification of ideas.
2 Fundamental uncertainty in particular represents a challenge for mainstream economic theory, 
which is based on the assumption of obtaining full information or on the possibility of calcu-
lating – objectively or subjectively – the probability with which certain events occur. From a 
sociological point of view, fundamental uncertainty is an important comparative advantage as 
it creates space for a greater role and a wider range of institutions than is the case in institutional 
economics. Moreover, it creates space for the role of other social mechanisms, be they structural 
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Uncertainty arises from limitations on the agents’ computational and cognitive capa-
bilities and from the complexity of the environment (Dosi/Egidi 1991; Simon 1955) and 
prevents actors from calculating the probability with which events occur (Beckert 1996, 
2002, 1999; Dequech 2000). In sociology, uncertainty is mainly procedural and can be 
divided into strategic and analytic uncertainty (Culpepper 2003; Iida 1993). While in 
the former case uncertainty concerns the intentions of the other players and, in the 
absence of social devices, leads to a non–cooperative, hence an inefficient solution, in 
the latter case uncertainty is both cognitive and environmental. It is connected to the 
general functioning of the economy and the inability of the actors to anticipate the con-
sequences of their behavior. On the one hand, uncertainty can in fact boost innovative 
behavior by the actors; on the other, the consequences of this behavior are unknown 
(Campbell 2004). In the case of analytic uncertainty, the intentions of players are known 
but there is “disagreement over means” in the process of decision-making. However, it 
could even be argued that uncertainty over the means first requires a reduction in the 
more general uncertainty over the actors’ interests and intentions. 
Under conditions of uncertainty, a general change in terms of interests requires the 
“construction” of those new interests and the legitimation of new behavior through 
ideas. Moreover, it requires processes of imitation based on information about the be-
havior of other actors and the mobilization of structural resources such as networks 
and power relationships. Although ideas and imitation processes are separated analyti-
cally here, they act jointly and reinforce each other. Processes of imitation are supposed 
to be stronger the more ideas are diffused; at the same time, the diffusion of ideas might 
depend on the activation of networks (Campbell 2005; McAdam 1986; McAdam/Scott 
2005), power relationships and high-status actors, which favor imitation in turn. 
Changing interests: The role of ideas
An interest could be defined as actors’ “want” constructed on the base of desires and 
beliefs (Blyth 2002). Ideas – be they cognitive constructs such as paradigms, worldviews 
and symbols, or normative constructs such as norms and values – respectively presume 
theoretical cause–effect relationships and influence what is desirable (Campbell 2004). 
Hence they can become beliefs and normative guides for the actors and exert influence 
on their interests. 
Although economic interests might appear relatively stable in periods of economic sta-
bility, they cannot be considered as given a priori. They are rather the result of a social 
construction in which the diffusion of economic ideas plays an important role, espe-
cially in periods of uncertainty. Economic ideas can in fact influence interests and help 
to generate different patterns of behavior by the actors. 
like networks and power, cognitive like ideas, or normative (Beckert 1996).
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In “The Social Psychology of the World’s Religions,” Max Weber argues that “very fre-
quently ‘world images’ that have been created by ideas have, like switchmen, determined 
the tracks along which action has been pushed by the dynamic of interests” (Weber 
1958: 280). Ideology and paradigms, as visions of the world, can in fact reduce uncer-
tainty by making sense of the functioning of the economy and hence by defining inter-
ests accordingly (Blyth 2002). They shape the legitimate ends of economic activities as 
well as the means to reach the socially approved ends (Jacobsen 1995). If, under condi-
tions of uncertainty, interests are not clear, ideas facilitate the choice of new strategies 
by altering the agents’ definition of the economic situation and their beliefs about the 
consequences of their own actions (Blyth 2002). As they influence the interpretation of 
reality and limit the range of options available for individuals, ideas affect the concrete 
individual behavior (Denzau/North 1994; North 1990). The more actors believe in an 
idea, and this becomes widespread, the more they will behave so that this will come 
true.
Changes in interests can be the product of a use of ideas by institutional actors facing 
policy dilemmas and legitimating new policy choices or facing problems of a lack of 
legitimation (Campbell 2004; Goldstein/Keohane 1993). In times of uncertainty ideas 
can act as “coalitional glues” (Goldstein/Keohane 1993) and facilitate cooperative solu-
tions; they can therefore reinforce representation and facilitate lobbying (Woll 2005).3 
Ideas can precede a change in interests. However they can also be used as ex-post justi-
fications for new desires emerging from economic pressures or be pushed by imitative 
logics. In both cases – whether they drive action or act as justification for action – ideas 
are central for the construction of meaning and legitimation (Campbell 2004).4
3 Generally speaking, market actors can influence state regulation directly, namely through plu-
ralistic lobbying activities or, as part of a corporatist system, through associations. These must 
rely on the consensus and cooperation of members (logic of membership); at the same time, the 
extent to which the interests of the members can be realized is constrained by their integration 
in the political and institutional system (logic of influence). The stronger the influence of as-
sociations on the state, the more the associations can govern members instead of simply repre-
senting them (Streeck/Schmitter 1985). However the pursuit of the “logic of membership” is not 
necessarily compatible with the pursuit of the “logic of influence” (Streeck 1994). Since keeping 
the two logics in balance is more problematic in periods of crisis, it can be reasonably expected 
that associations develop and diffuse ideas to make different positions more compatible.
4 New interests presume, or are accompanied by, a change at the cognitive level. However, since 
action also depends on other conditions that facilitate or constrain the coherent realization of 
interests (for example, where entrepreneurs are concerned, financial capabilities), not all inter-
est changes – hence not the total adoption of new ideas, paradigms and views of the world – 
translate into coherent action. The adoption of new ideas and the change in interests are there-
fore necessary conditions for intentions of action and action itself; however, they are not suffi-
cient ones.
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Changing interests: The processes of imitation
While ideas provide the cognitive premises and legitimation for changing interests, pro-
cesses of imitation also facilitate such change. These are fostered by the diffusion of in-
formation about the behavior of the other actors, and by the mobilization of the market 
structure, be it manifested in networks, power relationships or status hierarchies.
A simple form of imitation is so-called “herd behavior” in economic theory, where 
“everyone [is] doing what everyone else is doing even when their private information 
suggests doing something quite different” (Banerjee 1992). Herd behavior can be psy-
chologically determined. In this sense, actors behave irrationally and follow blindly 
what the other actors are doing. However, in economics, herd behavior tends to be con-
sidered as intrinsically rational for individual actors (Banerjee 1992; Devenow/Welch 
1996; Scharfstein/Stein 1990) since they assume they are in a situation of information 
asymmetry, whereby the behavior that everybody else is adopting is based on informa-
tion that “the others” may have and “they” do not. This approach does not of course say 
anything about possible processes of cognitive change. Although actors are supposed to 
take the behavior of other actors into account when it comes to making decisions, mar-
kets are not really considered to be arenas where social interaction occurs and meaning 
is constructed. Herd behavior is rather driven by signals like prices, reputation, “sharing 
the blame” logic as well as payoff externalities (Devenow/Welch 1996; Scharfstein/Stein 
1990).
For the new sociological institutionalism, in contrast, organizations operate in a field. 
Behavior is conditioned not only by market pressure (competitive isomorphism) but 
also by institutional pressure (institutional isomorphism) (DiMaggio/Powell 1983). In-
stitutional isomorphism is driven by myths, i.e. dominant visions and interpretations 
of the world that become appropriate and legitimate for organizations within that field 
(Meyer/Rowan 1991). Among the three forms of institutional isomorphism identified 
by the new sociological institutionalism,5 mimetic isomorphism is particularly impor-
tant. Especially under conditions of uncertainty, where acquiring information is par-
ticularly costly, market actors create cognitive categories and identify their actions with 
those of similar actors and of key actors that are considered as reference points (Bar-
reto/Baden-Fuller 2006). Hence, compared to “herd behavior,” mimetic isomorphism 
presumes a process of cognitive reorientation that allows new ideas and rules to become 
legitimate and behavior to be considered as appropriate. 
5 Beyond mimetic isomorphism Di Maggio and Powell (1983) have identified two further kinds 
of institutional isomorphism: coercive and normative. Coercive isomorphism refers to the co-
ercive role of regulation by public institutions and private organizations (especially through 
contracts with more powerful organizations). Normative isomorphism derives from the role of 
professional expertise (for example, of university specialists and consultants). The distinction 
between the different kinds of isomorphism is mainly analytical. In reality, the diffusion of new 
kinds of organizational behavior can be due to different types of isomorphic pressure simulta-
neously.
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Fields in which organizations operate can be considered to be imbued with cognitive 
and normative ideas. On the other hand, they can be viewed as arenas in which actors 
are structured in networks of vertical or horizontal relationships (Dobbin 2005; Flig-
stein 2001) and are positioned along a status hierarchy (Podolny 1993). DiMaggio and 
Powell (1983) have talked about the “connectedness” of the social structure.
Through networks, information about the behavior of the other actors is diffused, and 
ideas can more easily be constituted, be interpreted reflexively and become widespread 
(Campbell 2005; McAdam 1986; McAdam/Scott 2005), thereby making processes of 
imitation all the more probable. In vertical relationships, more powerful actors are able 
to give strong positive or negative economic incentives as well as legitimation incen-
tives if they encourage their behavior to be imitated. Information about the behavior of 
high-status market actors can induce imitative processes through legitimation as well. 
Status differs from the notion of reputation that builds on past behavior, as it is “more 
directly tied to the pattern of relations and affiliations in which the actor does or does 
not choose to engage” (Podolny 2005: 13). This implies that “when an actor engages in 
behavior that can be interpreted by others as an exchange or association with another 
actor, the status of each affects the status of the other” (ibid., 14). A status hierarchy 
cannot only be constructed by actors within the field but also by external observers such 
as regulators and the media (Barreto/Baden-Fuller 2006). These “legitimacy providers” 
attribute a particular status according to their particular aims through deference attri-
bution (Podolny 2005).
Ideas, imitation processes and the role of discourse
One precondition for changing interests and the homogenization of behavior is that 
information about the behavior of other actors is known and that ideas and their con-
sequences in terms of behavior become an issue. 
Through discourse, ideas and paradigms can be more or less strategically selected from 
a repertoire of possible assumptions about the functioning of the economy (Schmidt 
2003). New options of behavior, underlined by success stories and legitimated by high-
power and high-status actors, can emerge and gain importance compared to others. 
Moreover, economic and institutional actors can have a direct voice. They can use me-
dia relations to package and frame ideas to make decisions appealing and legitimate 
according to their interests (Campbell 1998).
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Generally speaking, there are at least two channels through which discourse can con-
struct ideas and influence the way actors behave. The first channel is constituted by the 
direct contact between the main actors in the discourse, the second by public debate 
– for example in the press. The analysis of the discourse in the public debate, which is 
presented in this paper, can be interpreted in two ways: on the one hand, as an arena 
in which the construction of ideas and diffusion of ideologies occurs; on the other, as 
a sort of reflection of the debate and consequent propagation of ideas and strategies 
among economic and institutional actors themselves. 
There might be unintended consequences of the diffusion of ideology and information 
through discourse. Imitation processes supported by ideas and discourse can gener-
ate problems both for individual actors, and at the aggregate level that are not easily 
rectified. In the case of economic “herd behavior,” where everyone is doing what ev-
erybody else is doing even contrary to what one’s own information would suggest, the 
unintended effect is a loss of general informativeness (Banerjee 1992) and an increase 
of inefficiency at the aggregate level (Devenow/Welch 1996). Since mimetic processes 
do not seem to be selective, i.e. able to distinguish between “good” and “bad” choices 
(Barreto/Baden-Fuller 2006), the diffusion of ideas through discourse can foster general 
patterns of behavior independently of the empirical “truth” of the ideas themselves. The 
simpler the causal relationship is between individual behavior and the improvement of 
market performance assessed by the supporting ideology, and the more the discourse 
is manipulated by certain actors to turn ideas to their own advantage, and the more 
prominent the statements by key economic actors advocating a particular best way are, 
the greater the inefficiencies in the discourse will be.
Performatists argue that some ideas are predestined to become self-fulfilling prophe-
cies (Callon 1998). The question is how long their prophecy will remain a “good” one 
(Miller 2002) and to what extent the consequences of behavior that is coherent with 
such ideologies can be reversed, both for individual actors and at the aggregate level. 
Possible consequences at the level of individual actors can range from disappointed 
expectations and frustration to economic failure due to the underestimation of envi-
ronmental and strategic uncertainty. Because of the high sunk costs associated with 
the decision to relocate, for example, reversing the trend can be very difficult indeed. 
At the aggregate level, the diffusion of ideas that foster centrifugal trends, i.e. by push-
ing entrepreneurs and managers to relocate their production, can help to break exist-
ing networks, generate loss of competences and, in the extreme case, produce general 
impoverishment of the economic structure even without clear advantages for the indi-
vidual actors.
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3 Entrepreneurs and managers in the processes of relocation:   
A decision model
How does the more general theoretical framework of the relationship between ideas, 
discourse and change that I sketched above fit the problematic of entrepreneurial deci-
sion-making over relocation? I will present some hypotheses about the contextual and 
decisional conditions for entrepreneurs and about the processes of imitation. 
Firstly, decisions about relocation are decisions made under conditions of uncertainty. 
Although entrepreneurs, managers and consultants may formally produce projections 
about future expenses and gains from new plants in low-wage countries, it is not pos-
sible to calculate in advance the costs caused by the lack of information and the conflicts 
created or accentuated, for example, by cultural differences or differences over produc-
tion between foreign management and local workers – problems that cannot be solved 
by appealing to hierarchy since networks continue to be the dominant governance mode 
through which transactions occur.
Secondly, complex decisions about relocating production are not supposed to be pri-
marily influenced by psychological characteristics like risk aversion or risk propensity 
on the part of the entrepreneurs and managers. They are rather the product of the social 
embeddedness of the entrepreneur and managers (Zukin/DiMaggio 1990).
Entrepreneurs and managers can be assumed to be operating within a field structured 
not only by power but also by networks (Fligstein 2001) and status orders (Podolny 
1993). Some companies in the field are supposed to be “first movers,” while others 
might decide to move later or continue to produce in the usual context. In their deci-
sion to move or stay, entrepreneurs and managers are influenced by ideas, norms and 
information about trends of behavior as well as by actors inside and outside the field. 
The decision to relocate or not requires the following conditions: 
A certain urge to change. This can come about either by a certain dissatisfaction with 1. 
the present and/or local conditions or by entrepreneurial momentum or opportu-
nity. The feeling that something should change can itself be an important impetus 
for “first movers.” However, it may be socially constructed more strongly in the case 
of “followers.”
A more or less well-founded evaluation of the context in which production is cur-2. 
rently taking place, be it the national, local or sectoral context. These valuations de-
pend not only on material resources and the experience of entrepreneurs or mana-
gers but also, as I will show subsequently, on the narration that circulates about the 
home country/region as a production location. This narration can serve to amplify 
or smooth the negative or positive characteristics of a production model. Sources for 
the construction of this narration are different: from networks to associations to the 
media (Wortmann/Dörrenbacher 1997).
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A perception of what other economic actors are going to do. Key actors are the im-3. 
mediate competitors, customers and those economic actors that operate in the same 
field or region.6 However, the perception of general trends and successful stories 
supported by the experience of key actors contribute to the identification of what 
appropriate behavior is or is not under given conditions on the part of the other 
market actors. Hence, difficult decisions – such as that of transferring part of the 
production processes abroad – become easier to legitimate and make plausible. 
Information about the contexts of projected investment. This includes a more or less 4. 
well-founded evaluation of the costs and gains of the investment. Entrepreneurs’ as-
sociations and Chambers of Commerce are supposed to be the organizations produ-
cing information as a club good, while consultants produce and sell information and 
problem-solving capacities as services on the market. Although the decision to profit 
from a particular service or not concerns the individual entrepreneur or manager, 
the target of information and communication by experts is always wider. 
Entrepreneurs need to make sense of the new decisions and to legitimate them, par-5. 
ticularly if they have negative consequences for the headquarters: for instance, in 
terms of less employment or even unemployment. Ideas about the functioning of 
the international market and the consequences of the decision to relocate can affect 
the decision to move. First movers might already be convinced by these ideas and 
be waiting until the time is ripe. However, ideas could serve as quasi ex post legiti-
mation and justification for an imitation of behavior. The latter possibility implies 
changes in the cognitive frames as well. 
Making sense of relocation or continuing production in the home country often means 
appealing to more general principles, such as ideas about competitiveness (Wortmann/
Dörrenbacher 1997), which also shape the valuation of the context and how public 
policies should develop.7
6 In relocation processes, legitimation can come from the pressure of both shareholders and other 
companies in the field. Reassuring signals from shareholders are more important in non-coor-
dinated market economies, but increasingly this also applies to companies in coordinated mar-
ket economies that make use of the stock market. For SMEs especially in coordinated market 
economies, legitimation is supposed to mainly derive from the pressure induced by the field. 
7 Competitiveness, for example, can be achieved in at least two different ways in a context of glo-
balization. Since factors of production are mobile, investments can migrate where cost condi-
tions are more favorable. Both relocation and global sourcing are therefore inevitable processes 
that contribute to the efficiency of the whole economic system. For the country of origin, the 
implications in terms of economic policies affect the reduction of wage and non-wage labor 
costs. A country in which labor and welfare costs are high is considered to be non-competitive 
(Sinn 2005).
 An alternative idea conceives of competitiveness as not being connected to cost reduction but 
rather to the capacity for innovating and realizing products, the quality of which can compen-
sate for higher costs. In this case, the “site” (Standort), i.e. a particular institutional and social 
environment which provides the conditions for producing such innovation and quality, is very 
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Companies can react to the new market challenges and to the different conceptions 
of competitiveness in different ways – say, through internal cost-cutting optimization, 
export reinforcement, relocation or investment in human capital – according to how 
interests and competitiveness are defined. Given the uncertainty over the functioning 
of global markets, dominant ideologies or paradigms supporting relocation can help to 
redefine the interests in such a way that relocating the production activities appears to 
be the most reasonable solution. 
Ideas can be used by different actors with different aims: for example, by dominant 
companies to carry out new strategies of production or to generate a critical mass able 
to facilitate the success of lobbying activities, or by associations as ways to enhance pow-
er in the political exchange and govern their membership. Interests can also be socially 
constructed by other experts. As we will see, scientists and consultants are particularly 
important. “Spin doctors” can be used by political actors to package political programs 
attractively (Campbell 1998), while at the same time gaining legitimation for their dis-
important (Biehl et al. 1975; Crouch et al. 2001; Streeck 1991, 1997). Relocation implies for 
firms the reconstruction of their site in the new context, which in turn can become very costly 
especially for SMEs (Hirsch-Kreinsen/Schulte 2000; Kinkel 2004). 
Figure 1 Ideas, discourse, actors and relocation
 
Decisions on 
relocation
External conditions 
(environmental 
uncertainty)
Other institu-
tional actors
Dominant 
discourse
Consultants
Ideas
Associations
Field
Companies
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cipline. Consultants can construct interests by providing the necessary information and 
expertise for their realization. They can use ideas and turn them to their commercial 
advantage.
In conclusion, the relationships between ideas and decisions in the processes of reloca-
tion can be summarized as represented in Figure 1. Ideas can influence the behavior of 
entrepreneurs or managers individually; the more widespread they become, the more 
likely they will be to provide for change in cognitive frames and interests as well. This 
depends on the social structure of the field, in particular on the type of relationships 
that characterize the networks and the position of crucial market actors. Finally, it de-
pends on the capability of other external or cross-field actors such as policymakers, 
associations and consultants to develop a dominant discourse and mobilize the social 
structure.
4 On the unpredicted costs of relocation:   
Strategic and cognitive uncertainty
Entrepreneurs and managers who decide to relocate their production have to engage 
in new market relationships and act under conditions of uncertainty, i.e. take non-
standard decisions, the outcome of which is not predictable. Decisions taken on the 
basis of previous experience might not lead in fact to efficient solutions. Because of 
the high initial costs, investments are not immediately reversible, so that any possible 
context-specific best practices can only be developed after the investment has taken 
place and the unpredicted costs of adaptation have already been incurred by the firm 
(Schulte 2002). 
Where specifically do these costs originate? Because production takes place in a new 
context, problems attributable to the asymmetry of information (strategic uncertainty)8 
and the asymmetry or lack of knowledge (cognitive uncertainty) are even more relevant 
than in the case of investment in the country of origin.
Possible consequences of the asymmetry of information are associated with the man-
agement of the labor force and the problems of quality and productivity losses, and/or 
possible opportunistic behavior by local suppliers or business partners. Opportunistic 
behavior can in turn be favored the more the regulation of property rights and the 
enforceability of contracts within the institutional asset of the new context are unclear. 
Furthermore, it can reasonably be expected that external investments, especially from 
8 Traditional problems of strategic uncertainty in organizations are emphasized by principal–
agent theory (see esp. Sappington 1991) and by transaction cost economics (North 1990; Wil-
liamson 1979, 1985).
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developed into developing countries, “induce” reciprocal skepticism and, consequently, 
stronger control on the part of the investors and more or less explicit resistance on that 
of the labor force or business partners. Cultural differences can also be accentuated in a 
situation of external “dominance” (Mense-Petermann 2006).
For entrepreneurs and managers, cognitive uncertainty can be subsumed under the 
concept of analytic uncertainty. Applied to the phase of adaptation in the new context, 
analytic uncertainty concerns knowledge about the functioning of the new market; it 
can generate costs for companies, i.e. while developing product and marketing strate-
gies or while finding and cooperating with foreign partners. Different visions of the 
world and conceptions of markets can lead to misunderstandings, decisional stagnation 
or conflicts that can be responsible for further costs or even investment failure.9 
5 The processes of relocation in Germany and their contradictions
Although Germany could still count on considerable FDI inflows (about 387.0 billion 
USD) between 1994 and 2003, it has become one of the most important countries in 
terms of capital outflows, which have amounted to 452.7 billion USD over the same 
period of time (OECD 2004). Moreover, several surveys point to growing relocation 
tendencies and plans among German companies (Deutsche Industrie- und Handels-
kammer 2003, 2006; Kinkel/Lay/Maloca 2004). According to these surveys, in 2004 
about one fourth of the companies were planning to relocate at least part of their pro-
duction activities for the next three years. Target countries were to be found especially 
in Eastern Europe and Asia.
International relocation of production is not only expanding quantitatively but also 
changing qualitatively. Firstly, it is not just the prerogative of big companies as it was in 
the past. SMEs are in fact increasingly investing in new production plants in low-wage 
countries. According to a survey carried out by the Fraunhofer Institut on a represen-
tative sample of German firms in the key sectors of German industry (machine tools, 
chemicals, electronics and automotive industries) between 1995 and 2003, the share of 
firms relocating their activities is still constituted by over 60 percent of firms with over 
500 employees (Kinkel/Lay/Maloca 2004). However, data on the dynamics over time 
(see Figure 2) show that SMEs are clearly catching up. Secondly, processes of reloca-
tion are widespread sectorally. They are not a prerogative of manufacturing industry 
9 There might also be a second type of cognitive uncertainty. This is related to possible changes in per-
sonal values and the perceptions of managers or entrepreneurs in the phase of adaptation in the new 
context. Processes of self-reflection on the new experience might translate into changes in their values 
and preferences concerning their willingness to work in the new context. Individual costs can translate 
into costs for the firm. High fluctuations of expatriates as a consequence of a redefinition of value can 
in fact hinder the continuity of management in the subsidiaries and prolong the adaptation phase.
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anymore; services are in fact increasingly decentralized as well (OECD 2004). Finally, 
relocation involves not only low value-added activities within industrial and service 
production; R&D activities, for example, are moving to low-wage countries as well. 
Although the processes of relocation of German companies seem to be growing, these 
processes do not seem to be free from contradictions. On the one hand, companies re-
locate because they are willing to cut costs; on the other, this strategy can itself produce 
costs that the entrepreneurs and managers fail to predict. As a consequence, there is a 
discrepancy between the expectations and the actual experiences of German entrepre-
neurs and managers regarding relocation (Table 1). The ambiguities of the strategies of 
relocation, especially where cutting costs is concerned, are evident if we consider, first, 
the share of companies returning their production to the home country and, second, 
how entrepreneurs and managers justify their choice to either relocate or repatriate. 
An estimation made on the basis of the survey of relocating firms shows that the share 
of firms returning home between 2001 and 2003 amounted on average to about one 
fifth of the firms that relocated in the same period of time.10 But, of course, given the 
high initial investment, one could imagine investment failures to be only the tip of the 
iceberg. Other companies might continue to produce in the new context but with higher 
10 On the repatriation of German companies, see also Schulte (2002).
Source: Fraunhofer Institut (Kinkel/Lay/Maloca 2004).
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levels of inefficiency than initially anticipated. By comparing the reasons to relocate and 
repatriate (Tables 1 and 2), we can see that the large majority of companies consider low 
production costs and the opening up of new markets to be the most important reasons 
for relocation, together with the aim of flexibility and ability to supply. Less important 
is the role played by the availability of qualified employees, the guarantee of quality 
standards and the need to cut the costs of coordination/communication. It could be 
argued that some of the typical strengths of the German model and the extent to which 
they can be found in the new context are somewhat underestimated.
In fact, if we look at the reasons why firms decide to repatriate (Table 2), quality problems 
are paramount. Even production costs represent a problem, as well as flexibility/ability 
of supply and the costs of coordination and communication. Relocation of production 
could be accompanied by an overestimation of the importance of the costs of production 
activities and by an underestimation of the typical advantages of Germany as a business 
location (Standort Deutschland) (Hardock 2000; Hirsch-Kreinsen/Schulte 2000).
Table 2 Motives for repatriating production between 2001 and 2003 
 (projections, %)
Quality 48.3
Costs of production factors 46.4
Flexibility/ability of supply 39.5
Availability of qualified employees 32.9
Costs of coordination/communication 28.5
Infrastructures 25.9
Capacity bottlenecks 13.3
Taxes and subsidies 0.0
Source: Fraunhofer Institut (Kinkel/Lay/Maloca 2004).
Table 1 Motives for the relocation of firms having relocated part of  
 their production abroad between 2001 and 2003 (projections, %)
Costs of production 85.0
Opening up of new markets 42.3
Flexibility/ability of supply 36.6
Capacity bottlenecks 28.7
Taxes and subsidies 28.2
Proximity to major customers 24.6
Availability of qualified employees 12.1
Presence of competitors 8.9
Infrastructures 5.8
Technological development 5.0
Quality 4.0
Costs of coordination/communication 3.0
Source: Fraunhofer Institut (Kinkel/Lay/Maloca 2004).
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6 The discourse on relocation in the German press (1990–2005)
Why is it that companies opt for relocation despite the risks involved and how can the 
contradictions mentioned above be explained? My thesis in this section is that, in the 
past, such decisions could be explained by a favorable discourse on relocating, which 
influenced the assessment of this strategic option by managers.11 
The extent to which ambiguities and the possible unexpected costs of relocation are 
thematized is the topic of the discourse analysis I have carried out for the German press 
between 1990 and 2005, the results of which will be presented in the following para-
graphs. 
The main results presented here try to answer questions about how the discourse in the 
press may have contributed to the “creation” and support of the option of production 
relocation over the years – particularly, how the relocation trend and the cost issues 
have been described – and how the relatively unpopular option for the home country is 
legitimated among entrepreneurs and managers, especially by referring to the common 
good.
In Table 3 I have compared statements on relocation, particularly on its quantitative 
and qualitative aspects. The statements include quotations on the relocation trend and 
the intentions of entrepreneurs and managers in manufacturing and services to de-
centralize production internationally – through outsourcing, offshoring or greenfield 
investments. They also include quotations on the evitable/inevitable character of the 
relocation trend. The analysis shows clearly that a major part of the quotations on the 
development of relocation presents it as an increasing, sectorally expanding and inevi-
table trend. This is relevant because, in the public view, relocation becomes an “almost” 
natural option and potentially a self-fulfilling prophecy. 
11 The relationship between the discourse and the actual relocation processes is difficult to prove 
in quantitative terms. The database on the press is not diachronically homogeneous, so that an 
increase in the number of articles is not necessarily a consequence of the increasing role of the 
topic in the press but of the fact that the database has become richer over time. Nevertheless 
there must be coherence between the discourse on relocation and its general trend, which I 
show in the empirical part.
Table 3 The relocation trend and its inevitability 
  (% of quotations on trends)
 No. %
Relocation is growing and inevitable 205 70.0
Relocation is less than imagined and not inevitable 88 30.0
Total 293 100.0
Source: Author‘s calculations (LexisNexis/Atlas.ti).
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This discourse is often connected to a rhetoric which underlines the lack of competi-
tiveness on the part of Germany, where wages and non-wage labor costs, taxes and state 
regulation are all seen as being too high and politicians are unable to introduce the nec-
essary reforms (Table 4). Quotations that ascribe the lack of company competitiveness 
to organizational inefficiencies or management errors are a small minority. 
The accent on Germany’s lack of competitiveness in the discourse on relocation is 
strong er in the press than the emphasis placed on the advantages of target countries 
to which German companies relocate, including cost advantages (Table 5). Indeed, the 
advantages of investing in low labor-cost countries are indirectly derived from the per-
ceived disadvantages of remaining in Germany. One consequence is that the discourse 
on relocation is constructed around the rhetoric of cost reduction and, possibly, around 
the neglect of further unexpected and non-calculable costs associated with the pro-
cesses of internationalization through relocation.
As Figure 3 shows, almost 70 percent of the quotations on the reasons for relocation 
transmit the idea that it contributes to cutting costs – be they taxation, wage or non-
wage labor costs, bureaucracy costs, etc. Only about one quarter of the quotations on 
relocation motives underline the point that relocation helps to gain new markets. A mi-
nority of quotations present the idea that relocation is connected to general processes 
of internationalization on the part of big companies and therefore of their suppliers. 
Hence, the discourse in the general and business press on relocation is focused more on 
cutting costs than on the argument that relocation contributes to the economic expan-
sion of German companies.
Table 4 German competitiveness vs. stagnation
 No. %
Germany is still competitive 79 33.8
Germany is not competitive anymore 152 65.0
German companies are not competitive anymore 3 1.3
Total 234 100.0
Source: Author‘s calculations (LexisNexis/Atlas.ti).
Table 5 German competitiveness vs. advantages of target countries
 No. %
Target countries are particularly attractive 85 32.4
Target countries are attractive under certain conditions 25 9.5
Germany is not competitive anymore 152 58.0
Total 262 100.0
Source: Author‘s calculations (LexisNexis/Atlas.ti).
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However, the focus of the press discourse on relocation is on the reduction of calculable 
costs. The share of quotations signifying that relocation cuts costs is clearly higher than 
the share of quotations according to which relocation is deemed to (also) have hid-
den costs (Table 6). Hidden costs are associated with the management of intercultural 
differences, organization problems (related to logistics, productivity, maintenance of 
quality standards, the need for further expertise), the lack of a skilled labor force, the 
danger of know-how transfer and the indirect support of potential competitors. The 
statement “relocation has hidden costs” also includes statements like “the risks of re-
location are not well considered,” “the benefits of relocation are less than expected” or 
“the benefits of relocation will be reduced in the medium to long run.” However, even 
the reference to the costs of relocation does not really have the function of inviting the 
decision-makers in the companies to make more reflective decisions. Rather, it is often 
used instrumentally by consultants to emphasize the need for (their) expertise by firms 
that want to relocate production.
Practices of relocation can increase if they are presented to and perceived by entrepre-
neurs and managers as something inevitable and gaining importance. They can increase 
if the disadvantages of the home country are emphasized and if relocation is presented 
as a simple solution to these disadvantages. However, like other unpopular decisions 
based on particularistic interests, the decision to relocate also needs to be justified with 
reference to the common good (Boltanski/Thevenot 2006). From this point of view, 
it is interesting to compare the statements on the effects of relocation for Germany 
(Table 7).
Figure 3 Discourse on relocation focused on cutting (calculable) costs 
  (% of quotations on relocation motives)
 
Following customers
8%
Gaining new markets
25%
Cutting costs
67%
Source: Author’s calculations (LexisNexis/Atlas.ti).
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The negative effects of relocation on developed countries easily come to mind: higher 
unemployment and reduction of foreign direct investment, know-how transfer, brain 
drain, etc. At the firm level this means, above all, downsizing (Ahlers/Öz/Ziegler 2007). 
However, the statements that emphasize the negative consequences of relocation ac-
count only for the minority of the quotations on this issue. In contrast, relocation is 
mainly considered to be neutral or even advantageous for the home country (Deutsche 
Bundesbank 2006). This position in the discourse reflects the economic idea of global-
ization as a win–win situation. While the globalization of markets produces a transfer 
of low-skilled labor to low-wage countries, it encourages the growth of high-skilled 
employment in the home country. Moreover, with production being in low-wage coun-
tries, consumers can profit from lower prices. Finally, as relocation is aimed at the ac-
quisition of new markets, this can only have positive effects for the headquarters. A 
consequence of this is that companies that wish to relocate their production can rely on 
a strong position that facilitates their choices with few moral doubts.
In conclusion, analytic uncertainty over the functioning of the economic system and 
over the effects of relocation on the home country can potentially leave room for dif-
ferent ideas and paradigms and for different legitimations of action to prevail in the 
discourse. Which discourse becomes dominant among market actors depends strongly 
on the protagonists, i.e. on those key actors that “create” and in some cases even ma-
nipulate the discourse.
Table 7 Effects of relocation on the home country 
  (% of quotations on effects)
No. %
Relocation negatively affects the home country 120 48.2
Home country profits or is not affected by relocation 129 51.8
Total 249 100.0
Source: Author‘s calculations (LexisNexis/Atlas.ti).
Table 6 Cutting costs vs. hidden costs associated with relocation 
  (% of quotations on relocation and costs)
 No. %
Relocation cuts costs 379 60.1
Relocation has hidden costs 252 39.9
Total 631 100.0
Source: Author‘s calculations (LexisNexis/Atlas.ti).
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7 The actors in the discourse on relocation
From the analysis presented above it is clear that, since the 1990s, a general discourse 
oriented to neo-liberal ideas has been widespread in public debate. This is not a mere 
coincidence, as is quickly evident if we consider the main actors that have a direct voice 
in the press and the way they use the press strategically. Figure 4 shows the direct quota-
tions identified in the press, broken down according to actors (where quoted). 
Entrepreneurs and managers play an important role in the debate in two ways. Firstly, 
they have the major voice among the protagonist actors. Secondly, they are present in 
the press through the several examples of (successful) relocation. This is crucial. Chang-
ing actors’ preferences often requires lead actors who have introduced changes and sup-
port them publicly – as well as successful cases. For entrepreneurs and managers to 
change their attitudes and preferences, the voice of their peers is much more credible 
than that of other actors would be. Moreover, successful examples can have a reinforc-
ing effect and encourage processes of imitation as well. According to our analysis of the 
press, around 65.2 percent of the entrepreneurs/managers’ quotations consider reloca-
tion positively. The remaining 34.8 percent express doubts as to the success of reloca-
tion or are in favor of keeping production in the home country.
The debate on relocation also appears to be carried out by experts, especially by econo-
mists, and by consultants. For the majority of experts (64.4 percent of experts’ quota-
tions), relocation is the inevitable expression of the importance of market principles 
and competition. Companies buy where the prices for raw materials and semi-manu-
factured products are lower, and they go where there is potential for labor-cost advan-
tages to help them gain market shares. Competition over price implies reforms that 
Figure 4 Actor presence in the German press on the issue of relocation  
  (% of quotations by groups of actors)
Source: Author’s calculations (LexisNexis/Atlas.ti).
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reduce the role of the state in the home country. Experts provide the ideological foun-
dation as well as the scientific legitimation for relocation. The rest (35.6 percent of 
quotations) consider relocation to be less inevitable and more problematic, especially 
for less standardized kinds of production. The competitiveness of a country should not 
only be measured by wage costs; productivity should also be taken into account. Finally, 
relocation is seen as more of a threat than an advantage to the home country.
Consulting firms have a special place in the debate. They are actors interested in increas-
ing relocation processes, as they are sources of expertise for companies on whom they 
are dependent. They have used the press systematically to develop their business. It is, in 
fact, not uncommon for articles on relocation to have been written around the results of 
surveys produced by consulting firms or on the basis of interviews with consultants. It 
is also not uncommon to find the contact of the consulting firm interviewed at the end 
of the article. Their position is a bit different from that of the economists. Consultants 
generally underline the inevitability of relocation processes and present the findings of 
studies of companies and their intentions to relocate. But they also underline some risks 
and costs which have to be considered appropriately by entrepreneurs and managers 
when they decide to relocate and which can be minimized by effective consulting. Some 
of the quotations on the costs of relocation mentioned above have to be interpreted in 
the logic of profitability on the part of consultants. All in all, consultants push compa-
nies to relocate. About 66.3 percent of quotations by consultants characterize relocation 
positively; the remaining 33.7 percent of quotations identify it as risky or problematic.
One might reasonably expect employers’ associations and the German Chamber of 
Commerce to figure more in the media, as the support for relocation can be consid-
ered part of a more general strategy of lobbying. In fact, 69 percent of quotations by 
the chambers and employers’ associations describe relocation positively, as a natural 
option for companies to escape the burdens of German state regulation in the absence 
of specific policies of deregulation. However, like unions, employers’ associations are 
generally less present in the debate, at least in the press. One explanation for this gen-
eral absence could be that, as the main representatives of bigger, often multinational 
companies, both employers’ associations and unions have mainly considered relocation 
as a strategy of economic expansion and not as a zero-sum game, which has become 
more evident recently. They have in fact started taking positions in the press only in 
recent years. Moreover, relocation is not seen by unions as a real threat to German em-
ployment from entrepreneurs; it is rather conceived of as an instrument for exerting 
pressure on the unions to alter the institutional equilibrium provided by the system of 
collective agreements. A second explanation is that, for the supporters of deregulation, 
unions and employers’ associations, as main actors in the system of industrial relations, 
are part of the world the German economy should distance itself from. This aspect is 
particularly evident if we consider that most of the debate has taken place in business 
magazines and the more conservative press rather than in the left-wing press.12
12 This paper does not aim to focus explicitly on the influence of the logic of media on the selec-
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8 Concluding remarks
In this paper I have highlighted and attempted to explain a contradiction. While pro-
cesses of the internationalization of production and, particularly, the willingness of 
companies to relocate are increasing, repatriates point to the importance of unexpected 
costs that can produce inefficiencies and conflicts and even lead to investment failure.
I have investigated the way the discourse has presented the phenomenon of the interna-
tionalization of production since the 1990s, with particular attention to the perceived 
relocation trend, the costs associated with relocation and the legitimation of the deci-
sion to relocate.
The German discourse is focused on the idea that relocation is increasing and inevita-
ble. A further idea transmitted by the discourse is that relocation leads to cost reduction 
without any additional friction. 
At the same time, the advantages of relocating are mostly derived in the press from 
the weaknesses of the German model rather than from any positive picture of the host 
country concerned. These presentations support the idea that relocation is inevitable, 
not only as a consequence of general technological development but also as an answer 
to government’s inability to introduce reforms that assist corporate cost cutting. If the 
institutional conditions remain stable and the negative effects of relocation on the home 
country are undetermined, relocating cannot be morally “condemned” – or at least the 
issue remains contentious.
The constellation of the main actors in the discourse and the use some of them make 
of the press help to explain why this particular discourse is prevailing. Recent contribu-
tions to political economy, organizational theory and economic sociology, in particular, 
have shown how ideas are important in reshaping actors’ interests and reorienting their 
behavior. The preference for relocating, like any other preference, is not given a priori 
but can be the result of a change at the cognitive level through the diffusion of ideas, 
which can make changes conceivable, plausible and legitimate. These changes can be 
the result of a deliberate use of ideas by institutional actors to promote cooperation or 
of processes of imitation supported by the social structure of the field and the diffusion 
of ideas themselves. 
tion and presentation of information. However, it can reasonably be expected that articles with 
clear (positive or negative) statements and strong slogans are more likely to be published by the 
newspapers and magazines compared to articles that offer more complex representations of 
reality; this increases the probability that a misleading kind of information will be diffused. 
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Appendix
The press analysis was conducted using the software for qualitative analysis Atlas.ti. It is 
based on the articles stored in the LexisNexis database between January 1990 and July 
2005. The database includes both German newspapers and the German business press. 
Some bias has to be allowed for because of the lack of homogeneity of the database. The 
LexisNexis database has in fact become increasingly richer over time, which of course 
does not permit a comparison through time. However, it can be stated that, at least 
since the mid-nineties, the database has begun to be relatively homogeneous. I have 
decided to include all the articles selected (see criteria below) for two reasons. There 
was a danger of losing information in a crucial time period. The beginning of the nine-
ties are important because this is the time immediately after the fall of the Berlin wall, 
which suddenly opened new investment perspectives outside the country for German 
companies. In addition, since the topic is relatively less common in the press compared 
to other issues, a further selection would not have allowed enough material to be avail-
able to carry out the analysis.
Four main phases of the empirical research can be identified for the discourse analysis.
1. Defining a grid of terms, combination of terms or paraphrases related to the concept 
of “relocation” for selecting the articles from the database (for example: “foreign direct 
investments” (or FDIs), “outsourcing,” “off-shoring,” “investments in foreign countries,” 
“internationalization” and “industry”). Our basic database includes 400 articles in total. 
The analysis has been carried out on all kinds of articles, be they general reports by jour-
nalists, opinion articles or contributions by decision-makers. Although their impact on 
company decisions may vary (articles based on statements by economic actors can be 
assumed to have more influence on companies than, say, opinion articles), all kinds of 
articles can potentially contribute to defining the economic and institutional situation 
in Germany and in the target countries, to identifying trends of company behavior, to 
discussing problems and providing solutions.
2. Selecting quotations connected to relocation and coding. The phase of coding with 
Atlas.ti has balanced deductive and inductive methods. On the one hand, we have fol-
lowed an initial grid of possible dimensions connected to the main research questions; 
on the other hand, this grid has had to be adjusted and enriched following the sugges-
tions from the empirical material, i.e. the text of the articles. All in all, we obtained 3429 
quotations, of which 666 quotations could be attributed to specific actors (see Section 
7). To analyze the actors’ positions, all direct and indirect quotations by the actors were 
coded with the actor’s code and, where necessary, also with a content code. The analyses 
presented in Tables 3–7 and Figure 3 were conducted on all quotations on the topic 
selected. The analysis in Section 7 is based on the quotations by actors. Since the paper 
does not primarily focus on the media and their strategies, journalists’ descriptions of 
reality, claims and normative statements have only been quoted with a content code.
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3. Constructing family codes. Family codes are codes situated at a higher level of ab-
straction than simple codes. They include codes characterized by semantic proximity 
and indicator relationship with the family code. The contrasted statements presented in 
Tables 3–7 are mainly family codes.
4. Transforming the Atlas.ti database into an SPSS matrix to facilitate quantifying quo-
tations and comparing the contrasting statements constituted by family codes.
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